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COMMENTARY
The Constitution, the Supreme Court,
and Creativity
By JEFFREY M. SHAMAN*
[The Supreme Court is] a kind of Constitutional Convention in
continuous session.
Woodrow Wilson'
We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what thejudges say it is. Charles Evans Hughes2
Introduction
According to orthodox ideology, the Supreme Court's function in
the constitutional process is essentially noncreative. Conventionally, it
is considered highly illegitimate for the Court to "revise" or to
"amend" the Constitution. It also is customarily believed to be ex-
tremely improper for the Court, when interpreting the Constitution, to
engage in "judicial legislation" or "policymaking." These articles of
faith are shared by several current members of the Supreme Court3 as
well as by a number of eminent constitutional scholars,4 all of whom
adamantly maintain that the Supreme Court's role is noncreative.
Acute examination of constitutional adjudication, however,
* Professor of Law, DePaul University. B.A., 1964, Pennsylvania State University;
J.D., 1967, University of Southern California; LL.M., 1971, Georgetown University.
1. E. CoRwiN, THE CoNSTrruIoN AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 5 (14th rev. ed. H.
Chase & C. Ducat 1978).
2. C. HUGHES, ADDRESSES AND PAPERS OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 139 (1908).
3. See Hearing on Nomination of Warren E. Burger to be Chief Justice of the United
States Before the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5-7 (1969); Rehnquist,
The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 Tnx. L. Rnv. 693 (1976).
4. See R. BERGER, GOvERNmENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FoURTEENmT AMEmNDmENT (1977); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problem; 47 IND. LJ. 1 (1971); Kurland, Government by Judiciary, 2 U. AR. LrrrLE ROCK
L. 307 (1979); Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227 (1972);
Monaghan, Of 'iberly" and "Propeny," 62 CORNELL L.J. 405 (1977).
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reveals a picture that differs fundamentally from the orthodox ideol-
ogy. It is a picture that need not be approached apprehensively; though
perhaps startling to those who have believed in the ideology, the pic-
ture is not necessarily an ugly"one. It portrays reality, and the time is
long overdue for a realistic understanding of the constitutional'process.
I. The Historical Foundation of Constitutional Creativity
Constitutional law is a dynamic process of creativity. Through the
continual interpretation and reinterpretation of the text of the docu-
ment, the Supreme Court perpetually creates new meaning for the
Constitution. Although it is formally correct to state that we have a
written Constitution, its words have been defined and redefined to the
extent that, for the most part, we have an unwritten Constitution, the
meaning of which originates in the Supreme Court.' Notwithstanding
the orthodox protestation that it is illegitimate for the Court to "revise"
or to "amend" the Constitution, this is in fact what the Court has al-
ways done by continually creating new constitutional meaning.
Much of the meaning that the Court creates for the Constitution
derives neither from its language nor from the intention of its Framers.
It has been observed that it is "a matter of unarguable historical fact"
that the Court has developed a body of constitutional doctrine whose
content cannot be ascertained from examining the language of the
Constitution or investigating the intent of the Framers.6 This has been
so since the earliest days of our history. Consider, for example,
Chisholm v. Georgia,7 a 1793 case decided during the tenure of the
Court's first Chief Justice, John Jay. In Chisholm, the Court ruled that
the jurisdiction of the federal courts under the Constitution could ex-
tend to suits instituted against a state in its sovereign capacity. Given
that the Constitution is silent concerning such jurisdiction, the source
of the Court's decision in Chisholm could hardly be the language of the
document. Moreover, the ruling was rendered despite the fact that "the
vesting of any such jurisdiction over sovereign states had been ex-
pressly disclaimed and even resented by the great defenders of the
Constitution, during the days of the contest over its adoption."' Thus,
5. See Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. Rv. 703 (1975).
6. Grey, Origins f the Unwritten Constitution Fundamental Law in American Revolu-
tionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. Rnv. 843, 844 (1978); see also Grey, supra note 5; Miller, The
Elusive Searchfor Values in Constitutional Interpretation, 6 HASTiNGS CONST. L.Q. 487, 489-
96 (1979); Perry, Intrepretivism, Freedom of Exression, and Equal Protection, 42 OHio ST.
L.J. 265 (1981).
7. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
8. 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNrrED STATES HISTORY 96 (rev. ed.
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as early as 1793, the Supreme Court was using its own initiative to
invest the Constitutioh with a meaning that previously could not be
found in either the text or the intent of the Framers.
The meaning that the Supreme Cotirt creates for the Constitution
finds its predominant source in the personal beliefs and values of the
individual justices who comprise the Court at any given time.9 Deriv-
ing from neither the language nor the history of the document, a great
deal of constitutional doctrine perforce has its roots in the personal
convictions of the Supteme Court justices. Throughout the Court's his-
tory, the justices have employed their own beliefs and values as the
foundation of their constitutional rulings.'° From federal supremacy, 1
vested rights,' 2 and commercial enterprise,' 3 through racial equality,
14
personal autonomy,' 5 and states' rights, 6 there is a long list of beliefs
and values that the justices themselves have deemed to be worthy of
constitutional shelter. Notwithstanding another orthodox protestation
that it is improper for the Court to engage in "judicial legislation" or
"policymaking," that in fact is what the Court has always done by for-
mulating constitutional meaning based upon the personal convictions
of the justices.
In the premodern period before the beginning of this century, the
Court tended to effectuate the convictions of the justices beneath a
1926). Warren also states, "[Tihe right of the federal Judiciary to summon a State as de-
fendant and to adjudicate its rights aid liabilities had been the subject of deep apprehension
and of active debate at the time of the adoption of the Constitution; but the existence of any
such right had been disclaimed by many of the most eminent advocates of the new Federal
Government, and it was largely owing to their successful dissipation of the fear of the exist-
ence of such Federal power that the Constitution was finally adopted." Id. at 91.
9. See Karst, Legilative Facts in Constitutlonal Litigation, 1960 Sup. Cr. REv. 75, 75-
77; Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. Cm. L.
REv. 661, 665 (1960); Shaman, The Rule of .easohablehess in Constitutional Adjudication:
Toward the End of Irresponsible Judicial Review and the Establishment of a Viable Theory of
the Equal Protection Claue,,2 HASTINGS CONST. LQ. 153, 161-72 (1975).
10. See note 9 supra.
11. See, ag., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
12. See, eg., Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518
(1819); Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815) Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch)
87 (1810).
13. See, eg., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897); Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) 1 (1842); Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (9 Pet.) 420 (1837).
14. See, eg., Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
15. See, ag., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
16. See, ag., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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cloak of natural law. 7 Not suprisingly, the Court was hardly immune
from the heavy influence that the natural law tradition exerted upon
early American legal thought.' Under this influence, the Court uti-
lized an assortment of natural law concepts to proclaim constitutional
doctrine, such as the divine ordinance,19 the natural order,20 the fumda-
mental laws of government,2' the lessons of history,' the norms of civi-
lization,' the concept of ordered liberty,24 and the sense of justice.25
When employing these natural law concepts, the Court gave the im-
pression that, rather than creating law, it was discovering or revealing
pre-existing law. By resort to this artifice, the Court was able to consti-
tutionalize the personal convictions held by the justices. Behind the
facade of predetermination, the premodern Court constitutionalized
personal values and beliefs held by the justices.
After the Civil War, the natural law tradition exerted little influ-
ence upon legal thought in this country, except in the field of constitu-
tional law,26 and even in that field its influence soon waned.27 Shortly
after the breakdown of the natural law tradition, the Court became
more willing to shed the disguise of predetermination for its constitu-
tional preferences. Throughout the present century, the Court typically
has constitutionalized the convictions of the justices through the pro-
cess of positive law,28 which more openly manifests the Court's law-
making function. Whether through the methodology of positive or
natural law, however, the Supreme Court perennially has originated
constitutional meaning that is rooted in the justices' own beliefs and
values.
17. See B. WRIGHT, AMERiCAN INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAw 330 (1931).
18. See Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background ofAmerican Constitulional Law (pts. 1
& 2), 42 HAxv. L. REv. 149, 365 (1928-1929).
19. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring, joined
by Swayne & Field, JJ.).
20. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896); Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
130, 141 (1872); Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 52 (1815).
21. Terret v. Taylor,. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 52 (1815).
22. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412,421 (1908); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,
164 (1878); Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872).
23. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 60-68 (1947) (Frankfurter, ., concurring);
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
24. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 537 (1977) (Stewart, J., dissenting,
joined by Rehnquist, .); Id. at 549 (White, J., dissenting); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46, 54 (1947); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
25. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169, 172-73 (1952); Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9
Cranch) 43, 50 (1815).
26. B. WRIGHT, supra note 17.
27. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 50-52 (1980).
28. See Grey, supra note 5, at 709.
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The custom of finding constitutional meaning in the words of the
document or in the Framers' intent, which has been referred to as "in-
terpretivism,"2 9 parallels the natural law tradition. First, interpretivism
denies creativity in the judicial process. Second, it posits a neutral judi-
ciary devoid of values and beliefs that finds law rather than makes it.
Finally, it insists that the Supreme Court function as a disinterested
medium revealing constitutional law that preexists in the language and
history of the Constitution. By viewing the document's text and history
as the only viable sources of constitutional meaning, interpretivism ob-
scures the Court's creative role.
Under the guise of interpretivism, the Court frequently professes
to ascertain constitutional doctrine strictly from the document's lan-
guage or history, when in truth it is doing nothing of the sort.30 Analy-
sis of the written opinions of the Court often shows that its purported
reliance upon the words of the Constitution or upon the Framers' in-
tent is more pretense than reality. In the first place, the Court has faced
few constitutional issues that can be definitively resolved by the text of
the document. Moreover, the Court has not been above the use of
forced readings of constitutional language as a means of concealing the
fact that it is creating constitutional meaning from the justices' own
beliefs and values. Two early instances of this technique can be ob-
served in Fletcher v. Peck3 and Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Wood-
ward.32 In Fletcher, the Court stretched the meaning of the contracts
clause of article I to cover a state legislative grant of land. In the
Dartmouth College case, the Court extended the meaning of the same
clause to apply to a college charter granted by King George I prior to
the Revolution. A more contemporary example is United States v.
Richardson,33 in which the Court held the article I requirement that "a
regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all
public Money shall be published from time to time" was not a specific
29. J. ELY, supra note 27, at chs. 1 & 2. The term "interpretivism" is not entirely accu-
rate to describe this school of thought, because "interpretivism" connotes creativity, whereas
interpretivists deny creativity. However, since the term seems to be gaining currency, it will
be used occasionally herein. A more accurate, though unwieldy, phrase is "textual-
intentionalism."
30. Grey, supra note 5, at 706, 709. See a/so Alfange, On Judicial Policymaking and
Constitutional Change" Another Look at the "Oiginal Intent" Theory of Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 5 HAsTINGs CoNST. L.Q. 603, 617 (1978); tenBroek, Uses by the United States
Supreme Court of Extrinic Aids in Constitutional Construction, 27 CALIF. L. Rnv. 399, 404
(1939).
31. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
32. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
33. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
34. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cL 7.
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constitutional limitation on the congressional taxing and spending
power. All three of these decisions strain the text of the Constitution so
as to originate meaning for it.
There are further instances where the Court has engaged in a more
complex manipulation of constitutional language to obscure judicial
creativity. An illustration of this phenomenon can be seen in no less a
case than Marbury v. Madison,35 which, because it establishes the
power of judicial review, is generally agreed to be the most important
decision ever rendered by the Supreme Court. In Marbury, the Court
declined to accept a grant of statutory jurisdiction on the ground that it
was "repugnant to the Constitution. 36 Although the Court's decision
purports to emanate directly from the text of the document, in truth, it
does no such thing. Underlying the Court's professed reliance upon the
constitutional text is a significant assumption-that the Court possesses
the august authority to determine that a statute, duly enacted by Con-
gress and approved by the President (or enacted over his veto), is nev-
ertheless "repugnant to the Constitution. '37 By making this unspoken
assumption, the Court was able to establish judicial review as the law
of the land and thereby to direct the course of the nation's history.
That judicial review is nowhere mentioned in the Constitution and
finds, at best, questionable support in the Framers' intent38 did not de-
ter the Court from instituting it as a constitutional doctrine. Obtaining
from neither the text of the Constitution nor its history, the power of
judicial review was cut from whole cloth by the Supreme Court with
the appearance that it was compelled by a plain reading of the docu-
ment. The simplicity of the Court's announcement is deceptive, for ju-
dicial review is a Supreme Court creation.
Concealment of the Court's creativity also occurs under the mantle
of history. The Court has been known to invent its own version of
constitutional history with little or no inquiry into the actual past.39 It
has been observed that this practice, described as "the creation of his-
35. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
36. Id. at 176.
37. "'The question,' Marshall's opinion begins, 'whether an act repugnant to the Con-
stitution, can become the law of the land, is a question deeply interesting to the United
States; but, happily, not of an intricacy proportioned to its interest.' Marshall's confidence
that he could traverse the path ahead with ease is understandable, since he had already
begged the question-in-chief, which was not whether an act repugnant to the Constitution
could stand, but who should be empowered to decide that the act is repugnant." A. BicnKr,
THE LEAST DANGERous BRANcH 3 (1962).
38. See Levy, Judicial Review, History and Democracy: An Introduction, in JUDICIAL
Ruvmw Amw nm SuPREE COURT 1-12 (L. Levy ed. 1967).
39. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 119, 122-25.
[VoL 9:257
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tory a priori by... 'judicial fiat,' "I was introduced by John Marshall
and has been used by the Court ever since.41 Similarly, the Court de-
vises its own rendition of history by selecting those portions of the his-
torical record that are congenial to the justices' views, while
conveniently overlooking those portions of the record that the justices
find less palatable.42 The Court also is prone to invoke the Framers'
intent when it suits the purposes of the justices, but to ignore or depre-
cate it on other occasions.' An extreme instance of this occurred in the
Slaughter-House Cases,' in which the Court went so far in ignoring
the Framers' intent that it rendered the Fourteenth Amendment privi-
leges and immunities clause superfluous.45 When later confronted with
its disregard for the intention of the Framers, the Court's deprecatory
rejoinder was that "what is said in Congress [during the discussion of a
proposed constitutional measure] may or may not express the views of
the majority of those who favor adoption of the measure. . . ."4 By
resort to these various devices, the Court uses history as a pretext for
obfuscating its creative mode of operation.
To its credit, the Court is not always so disingenuous about its
creative function. On several occasions, the Court has stated candidly
that it is not necessarily bound to follow the Framers' intent. The
Court's most well-known and perhaps strongest statement to that effect
came in 1934 in Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell;47 the
Court has made similar statements both before and after Blaisdell.48
40. Id. at 122.
41. Id. at 123-25. Kelly identifies three "notable instances of this sort of judicial his-
tory": Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36
(1873); Hepburn v. Griswold (the first Legal Tender Case), 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870).
42. Kelly, supra note 39, at 122, 125-32. Kelly identifies two "notable decisions" of this
sort: Pollack v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (The Income Tax Cases), 157 U.S. 429 (1895);
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
43. See Alfange, supra note 30; Kelly, supra note 39; tenBroek, supra note 30.
44. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
45. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsTrrTUiONAL LAW 423 (1978); McGovney, Privileges or
Immunities Clause, Fourteenth Amendment, 4 IOWA L. BULL. 219, 219-21 (1918).
46. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 601 (1900).
47. 290 U.S. 398 (1934). The Court said, "If by the statement that what the Constitu-
tion meant at the time of its adoption it means to-day, it is intended to say that the great
clauses of the Constitution must be confined to the interpretation which the framers, with
the conditions and outlook of their time, would have placed upon them, the statement car-
ries its own refutation. It was to guard against such a narrow conception that Chief Justice
Marshall uttered the memorable warning-'We must never forget that it is a constitution we
are expounding." Id. at 442-43 (quoting MlcCulloch . faryland) (emphasis in original).
48. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 191-92 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring); Ab-
ington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); Brown
v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954); Olimstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
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Additionally, there are many occasions when the Court engages openly
in creativity, making no attempt to disguise the fact that justices' con-
victions are being employed to formulate new constitutional doctrine.49
Probably the most forthright acknowledgment of the Court's creativity
has come from Justice White; commenting upon the Court's decision in
Miranda v. Arizona,50 he wrote,
[T]he Court has not discovered or found the law in making to-
day's decision, nor has it derived it from some irrefutable sources;
what it has done is to make new law and new public policy in
much the same way that it has in the course of interpreting other
great clauses of the Constitution. This is what the Court histori-
cally has done. Indeed, it is what it must do and will continue to
do until and unless there is some fundamental change in the con-
stitutional distribution of governmental powers.51
As Justice White describes, the Court has had a long history of
originating constitutional meaning. Critics who attack the Court's use
of creativity in cases such as Brown v. Board of Education52 and Roe v.
Wade53 on the ground that it amounts to unprecedented "activism
' 54
are laboring under an historical misapprehension. Creativity is no
more actively present in Brown than it was in many another case, in-
cluding, it might be mentioned, Plessy v. Ferguson,55 in which the jus-
tices' manifest antipathy toward "commingling" of the races led the
Court to institute the "separate but equal" doctrine as constitutional
law. As for Roe, creativity is no more present there than it was fifty
years before in Meyer v. Nebraska,56 in which the Court initiated the
right of privacy as a constitutional principle. In whatever era one ex-
amines, it is evident that the Supreme Court has played an active role
in creating constitutional law to cover a wide variety of interests and
472-74 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433-34 (1920);
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373-74 (1910).
49. See, e.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Hepburn v. Griswold,
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). See
also notes 47 & 48 supra.
50. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
51. Id at 531 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Harlan & Stewart, JJ.).
52. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
53. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
54. See, e.g., R. BERGER, supra note 4; Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf .4 Comment on
Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
55. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
56. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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has even applied creativity to both sides of the same issue.57 The sheer
volume of constitutional doctrine can hardly be explained by mere ref-
erence to the wording of the Constitution or the intention of the Fram-
ers. Painting with both broad and narrow strokes, the Supreme Court
has been a most prolific artist, trusting its own muses to create new
meaning for the Constitution.
Although it would seem undeniable that the Court's creativity is
an historic fact, there has been a persistent inclination to deny the
Court's long standing creative role.58 This proclivity intensifies in the
wake of controversial decisions made by the Court.5 9 Every epoch has
its own controversial decision that is mistakenly condemned as the
Court's first foray into creativity.60 The denial of the Court's historic
creativity operates as a means of rationalizing disapprobation of partic-
ular decisions rendered by the Court. By successively rejecting the
Court's creativity, each generation finds it possible to attack new deci-
sions that meet with some disapproval. The endurance of the disposi-
tion to deny the Court's creative role, however, has a deeper cause.
Fundamentally, it is rooted in a nostalgia for the natural law tradition
that portrayed the judiciary as an impartial vehicle through which pre-
ordained truth was revealed. 61 The natural law vision of the judicial
process has a certain appeal in that it is comforting to believe that
judges are altruistic oracles devoted to a search for justice.. Unfortu-
nately, the security provided by this vision is a false one. The natural
57. Compare, ag., Ro-hbjiv. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) with Briethaupt v. Abram,
352 U.S. 432 (1957).
58. See notes 3-4 supra.
59. See, ag., A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 121 (1970)
(discussing Brown . Board ofEduc.); 2 L. BOUDIN, GovERNMENT By JuDIciARY 433-42
(1932) (discussing Lochner . New York); 3. ELY, DEMocRAcY AND DISTRUST 221 (1980)
(discussing Griswold v. Connecticut); 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED
STATES HISTORY 129-31 (1922) (discussing Chisholm v. Georgia); id. at 200 (discussing Mar-
bury v. Madison); Ely, The Wages of Crying Wof- 4 Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.
920 (1973); Sacks, Foreword" The Supreme Court 1953 Term, 68 HARv. L. REv. 96 (1954)
(discussing Brown v. BoardofEduc.). See generally 2 C. WARREN, THE SUPRaME COURT IN
UNrrED STATES HIsToRY 461-62 (1922).
At times this inclination to deny the Court's creative role even affects Supreme Court
justices. Consider, for example, the remark made by Justice McReynolds after delivering
his dissenting opinion in the Gold Clause Cases, 294 U.S. 330 (1935): "As for the Constitu-
tion, it does not seem too much to say that it is gone. Shame and humiliation are upon us
now," reported in 2 W. SWINDLER, COURT AND CONSTrrUTION N THE TWENTIETH CEN-
TuRY, 1932-1968, at 37 (1970).
60. See, ag., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1945); Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.)
603 (1870); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
61. See M. SIAPIRo, LAW AND PoLITIcs IN TIE SUPREME COURT 19-20 (1964).
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law conception of judicial process is considerably more fantasy than
fact, as evidenced by the collapse of the natural law tradition under the
weight of nearly unanimous repudiation by modem legal scholars.6s
The same fatal flaws that led to the demise of natural law also afflict its
constitutional equivalent that disclaims the Supreme Court's creative
role. As was the case with the natural law tradition, the belief that the
constitutional process is noncreative not only ignores reality, but also,
as will be seen next, is theoretically impossible.
H. The Theoretical Foundation of Constitutional Creativity
As a theoretical matter, the Supreme Court's creative role is inevi-
table because it is the only practical way to interpret the Constitution.
Interpretivist attempts to find meaning for the Constitution in its text or
history are doomed to failure.63
It is obvious that the language of the Constitution requires a great
deal of supplementation from extratextual sources. Indeed, as the
Supreme Court once observed, "no word conveys to the mind, in all
situations, one single definite idea."64 The more general or abstract a
word is, the less precise is its meaning, and the Constitution, designed
"to endure for ages," 65 necessarily is rife with generalities and abstrac-
tions. Even interpretivists admit that much of the Constitution is
phrased in such broad and abstract language that it must be invested
with meaning which simply cannot be found within the "four comers"
of the document itself.66 The utter necessity to look beyond the text of
the Constitution is illustrated in a variety of contexts. For example,
does article I authorize Congress to establish a federally chartered
bank67 or to issue paper money as legal tender?68 Does the interstate
commerce clause allow Congress to regulate moral aspects of commer-
cial enterprise69 or to regulate intrastate commercial activities that have
62. See J. ELY, supra note 27, at 50-52, and sources cited therein.
63. For illustrations of devastating criticism leveled at interpretivism in recent years, see
J. ELY, supra note 27, at ch. 2; A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT-MYTH AND REALITY 25-
31 (1978); Alfange, supra note 30; Brest, The Misconceived Questfor the Original Understand-
ig, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204 (1980); tenBroek, supra note 30.
64. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 414 (1819).
65. Id. at 415.
66. See Rehnquist, supra note 3, at 694, 697.
67. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
68. See Knox v. Lee (the second Legal Tender Case), 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871);
Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870).
69. See Hammer v. Dagenhart (The Child Labor Case), 247 U.S. 251 (1918); Hoke v.
United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913); Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321
(1903).
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an interstate impact?7" Does the free exercise of religion clause give
one the right to engage in polygamy7 or to be exempt from compulsory
education laws?72 These questions and innumerable others can hardly
be resolved by mere linguistic analysis of the Constitution. Given the
generality and abstractness of the Constitution, it should not be surpris-
ing that its text is of little assistance in dealing with the vast majority of
constitutional issues; at best the Constitution is a prelude or remote
starting point for deciding cases or promulgating rules.
Reliance on the Framers' intent to find meaning for the Constitu-
tion also has serious theoretical drawbacks. In the first place, why
should we be concerned only with the intentions of those individuals
who drafted the Constitution, and not with the intentions of the people
who ratified it or the succeeding generations who acquiesce in retaining
it?73 Even when finally framed, the Constitution remained a legal nul-
lity until ratified by the people and would again be a nullity if revoked
by the people. Why then should the Framers' intentions be taken as
binding upon the people? The intent of the Framers does not express
the will of the people74 and therefore cannot be considered obligatory.
What the Framers finally decided to express in the Constitution itself
possesses the force of law; but the same cannot be said for what the
Framers did not express therein, and therefore their omission "has no
binding force upon us."7
Moreover, there are considerable difficulties in discerning what in
fact the Framers intended. The Journal of the Constitutional Conven-
tion, which is the primary record of the Framers' intent, is neither com-
plete nor entirely accurate.76 The notes for the Journal were carelessly
kept77 and have been shown to contain several mistakes.78 Even when
the record cannot be faulted, it is not always possible to ascertain the
70. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); United States v. E.C. Knight Co. (The Sugar
Trust Case), 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
71. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
72. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
73. Wofford, he Biding Li'ht: The Uses ofHitory in ConstiiutionalInterpretation, 31
U. Cm. L. Rnv. 502, 508 (1964).
74. J. ELY, supra note 27, at 411-12.
75. C. Cutns, LIONS UNDER THE THRONE 2 (1947).
76. Wofford, supra note 73, at 504-06. The incomplete notes of James Madison com-
prise the primary record of what transpired at the convention. D. ROHDE & H. SPAM,
SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKNG 41 (1976).
77. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONwEISrON OF 1787 xii-xiv (Farrand ed.
1937).
78. Id.
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Framers' intent. As might be expected, the Framers did not express an
intention about every constitutional issue that would arise after the
document was drafted and adopted. No group of people, regardless of
their ability, enjoys that sort of prescience. When the Framers did ad-
dress particular problems, often only a few of them spoke out. What
frequently is taken to be the intent of the Framers as a group turns out
to be the intent of merely a few or even of only one of the Framers, and
it would be a mistake to suppose that those Framers who expressed
their views always spoke for those who remained silent. There also are
constitutional issues about which the Framers expressed confficting in-
tentions.79 A collective body of fifty-five individuals, the Framers em-
braced a widely diverse and frequently inconsistent set of views.8 0 It is
anomalous, therefore, to ascribe a unitary intention to the Framers." '
On several occasions, the Supreme Court has observed that it is untena-
ble to attribute a unified intent to a multi-member group such as the
one assembled at the Constitutional Convention.8 2 The Framers' in-
tent, at best, is inadequately documented, ambiguous, and inconclusive;
at worst, it is illusory.
Even if these obstacles could be surmounted, it still might not be
analytically valid to follow the path of the Framers. The Framers
formed their intentions in the context of a past reality and in accord-
ance with past attitudes, both of which have changed considerably
since the Constitution was drafted.83 To transfer those intentions, fash-
79. 7 C. WARREN, supra note 8, at 91.
80. In fact, the Framers of the original constitution are only those fifty-five delegates to
the Constitutional Convention who were the most active in the proceedings. Delegates to
state conventions who voted to ratify the Constitution as well as those people who selected
them are not included. D. ROHDE & H. SPAETH, supra note 76, at 41.
81. See Bishin, T7he Law Finders.: An Essay in Statutory Interpretation, 38 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1 (1965); Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. Rlv. 863 (1930).
82. "It is clear that what is said in Congress [during the discussion of a proposed consti-
tutional measure] may or may not express the views of the majority of those who favor the
adoption of the measure. . . .What individual Senators or Representatives may have
urged in debate, in regard to the meaning to be given to a proposed constitutional amend-
ment, or bill or resolution, does not furnish a firm ground for its proper construction, nor is
it important as explanatory of the grounds upon which the members voted in adopting it."
Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 601-02 (1900).
"There is, too, a general acquiesence in the doctrine that debates in Congress are not
appropriate sources of information from which to discover the meaning of the language of a
statute passed by that body.. .. The reason is that it is impossible to determine with cer-
tainty what construction was put upon an act by the members of a legislative body that
passed it by resorting to the speeches of individual members thereof. Those who did not
speak may not have agreed with those who did; and those who spoke might differ from each
other ... ." United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 318 (1897).
83. See P. BREsT, PROCESSES OF CoNsTrrrtIoNAL DEcIsioN-MAKNc-CAsms AND
MATERIALS 157-69 (1975).
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ioned under past conditions and views, to contemporary situations may
produce sorry consequences that even the Framers would have ab-
horred had they been able to foresee them. Consideration of intentions
formulated in response to past conditions and attitudes is not very
likely to be an effective means of dealing with contemporary issues.
Adherence to the Framers' intent thus reduces the capacity of the Con-
stitution to be used in response to the needs of modem society.
Professor Wofford takes this line of reasoning one step further. He
maintains that the Framers' intent is locked into a past time and has no
meaning at all for the present 84-- that is, because the Framers formed
their intentions with reference to a reality and attitudes that no longer
exist, it cannot be said that they had any intentions whatsoever con-
cerning the future. If, as Professor Wofford believes, the Framers' in-
tent is inextricably bound to the past, then it is senseless to attempt to
transplant their intent to the present or future. What the Framers in-
tended for their times is not what they may have intended for ours.
Life constantly changes, and the reality and ideas that surrounded the
Framers are long gone.
The theoretical pitfalls of attempting to extend the Framers' intent
beyond its time are vividly apparent in a case such as Abington School
District v. Schempp, 85 in which the Court held that prayer recitations
and Bible readings in the public schools violate the establishment
clause of the First Amendment. InAbington, the Court could have an-
alyzed the intent of the Framers to support the opposite result. Though
fairly ambiguous (as might be expected), the historical record can be
read to say that the Framers did not intend the establishment clause to
prohibit religious exercises in the public schools.8 6 Even if we assume
that the historical record strongly indicates the Framers' intent, honor-
ing that intent in modem times would be to disregard mistakenly the
changed conditions of reality. Education, in the days of the Framers,
was conducted mainly by private sectarian schools, whereas in more
recent times, education is primarily public and secular.87 Additionally,
our nation is more religiously heterogeneous than it was when the Con-
stitution was framed and adopted.88 To use the words of Justice Bren-
84. See Wofford, supra note 73, at 511-23.
85. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
86. See C. ANTmAu, A. DOWNEY & E. ROBERTS, FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTAB-
LISmFNT 123-42 (1964); L. PEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 128-80 (rev. ed.
1967); Sky, The Establishment Clause, the Congress and the Schools: An Historical Perspec-
tlv1e 52 VA. L. REv. 1395, 1397-1427 (1966).
87. L. PFEFFER, supra note 86, at 321-38.
88. See Abington School Dist., 374 U.S. at 240 (Brennan, J., concurring); STAFF OF
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nan, "In the face of such profound changes, practices which may have
been objectionable to no one in the time of Jefferson and Madison may
today be highly offensive to many persons, the deeply devout and the
nonbelievers alike." 9 Thus, we can see that the Framers' intent, cast in
a bygone era, speaks to the past, but not necessarily to the present or
future.
Let us turn our attention once again to Brown v. Board of Educa-
don,90 which has been described by Raoul Berger as a case that unjusti-
fiably departs from the Framers' intent. In his recent book,91 Professor
Berger argues that the Court's ruling in Brown, that racial segregation
of public schools violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, "upends" the Amendment "to mean exactly the opposite
of what its framers designed it to mean." 92 Backing his argument with
a substantial amount of evidence,93 Professor Berger asserts that the
Framers specifically considered and rejected the possibility of outlaw-
ing racial segregation in public schools.94 Accepting arguendo that he
is correct in his assertion, the fact remains that the Framers' intent was
formulated under a very different reality and in a very different social
and ethical climate than those which existed in 1954 when Brown was
decided. In the Brown opinion itself, the Court explained that at the
time of the Fourteenth Amendment's adoption, the movement toward
free public schooling had not yet taken hold in the South, and that even
in the North, public education standards did not approximate those
existing in 1954.95 Education of blacks in the South was practically
nonexistent,96 and the importance of an education was not close to
what it was in 1954. What the Court also could have said-but perhaps
was politic enough to leave unspoken-was that the Framers who
adopted the Fourteenth Amendment were themselves laboring under
an extremely racist attitude. Professor Berger admits that even most of
the Framers who favored enactment of the Amendment believed that
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDIcIARY, 88TH CONG., 2D SESS., PRELIMINARY STAFF STUDY ON
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION RELATING TO SCHOOL PRAYERS, BIBLE
READING 11-14 (Comm. Print 1964).
89. 374 U.S. at 241 (Brennan, J., concurring).
90. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See text accompanying notes 52-55 supra.
91. R. BERGER, supra note 4.
92. Id. at 245.
93. Id. at chs. 4, 10 & 13. Some historians have severely criticized his research methods.
See, e.g., Kutler, Raoul Berger's Fourteenth Amendment: A History orAhistorical?, 6 HAs-
TINGS CONST. L. Q. 511 (1979); Soifer, Protecting Civil R'ghts: A Critique of RaoulBerger's
History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 651 (1979).
94. R. BERGER, supra note 4, at chs. 7, 10 & 13.
95. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. at 489-90.
96. Id. at 490.
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blacks were inherently inferior to whites.97 Except for a minority of
extremists, those who supported the Amendment feared and despised
blacks, 98 and their "obsessive preoccupation" was "not civil rights...
but the dreaded take-over of the federal government by the South."99
In 1954, a very different situation prevailed. Virtual universal ed-
ucation had come into being and the intellectual abilities of blacks
'could no longer be denied. A high school diploma, not to mention a
college education, had become the sine qua non of financial and profes-
sional success. While still present, racist attitudes had abated. Studies
showed that a majority of whites no longer believed in the inherent
inferiority of blacks. 100 A distinguished historian of race relations was
able to say that public opinion outside the South was receptive and
generally favorable to the Brown decision,10' and there is additional
evidence that racism was beginning to subside even in the South by
1954.102 Given these sweeping changes in attitudes and conditions, it is
difficult to comprehend how the Framers' intent could possibly be ap-
plied to 1954. As the Court cogently observed in Brown, "[W]e cannot
turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted."' 10 3
The Framers of the Constitution may have been wise men, but not
so wise that they could predict and plan for the future. That is not to
say that the Framers' intent should be completely ignored; only a fool
would suggest that there are not valuable insights to be learned from
history. It is to say that the Framers' intent should not be used as an
authoritative source to determine the meaning of the Constitution. We
should allow the Framers to advise us, but not to rule us.'o4
Ironically, the Framers seemed to be wise enough to know their
limitations in this regard, and therefore included in the Constitution
open-ended provisions, such as the Ninth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, as invitations for future constitutional creativity. For interpre-
tivists who insist upon strict adherence to the Framers' intent, this poses
a fundamental dilemma: It seems that the Framers intended to author-
ize constitutional creativity that is not circumscribed by their
intentions.
97. See R. BERGER, supra note 4, at 10-15.
98. See id.
99. Id. at 15.
100. RL BURKEY, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE UNrrED STATES
36 (1971).
101. C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF Jim CRow 149 (2d rev. ed. 1966).
102. Wiebe, White Attitudes andBlack APghtsfrom Brown to Bakke, in HAVE WE OVER-
comE? RACE RELATIONS SINCE BROwN 147-50 (M. Namorato ed. 1979).
103. 347 U.S. at 492.
104. See C. CUms, supra note 75, at 2-8; Wofford, supra note 73, at 530-33.
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Given the theoretical deficiencies of the historical approach of re-
lying upon the Framers' intent, it should not come as a surprise that
this approach has been a failure when put into practice by the Supreme
Court. Scholars who have closely studied the Court's use of the histori-
cal approach commonly agree that it has not been a satisfactory
method of constitutional decisionmaking. 1° 5 The Court has been criti-
cized often for manipulating, revising,'or even creating history when it
purports to follow the Framers' intent. 6 A particularly studious anal-
ysis of the historical approach to constitutional law concludes that it is
one of the Court's "fundamental doctrinal fallacies." 10 7 Neither the
Framers' intent nor the words of the document are capable of provid-
ing much constitutional meaning. As a theoretical matter, then, mean-
ing for the Constitution necessarily requires an act of creation by the
Supreme Court.
I. The Political Foundation of Constitutional Creativity
Interpretivists frequently inveigh against constitutional creativity
on the ground that it is undemocratic.108 It is argued that in a demo-
cratic system of government, Supreme Court justices-unelected offi-
cials who are unaccountable to the people--should not be able to
create meaning for the Constitution. This theme echoes the criticism
that was leveled during the Jacksonian era against the power of com-
mon law judges to make law."° Although the creative authority of
common law judges is now accepted throughout the legal community,
aversion still exists to judicial creativity in the constitutional arena." 0
That tort or contract rules are made rather than found by judges is
today entirely acceptable; that constitutional rules should be no differ-
ent has been a more bitter pill for some to swallow. It does not seem to
comport with democratic theory to find that the least representative
branch of our government, the Supreme Court, is creating no less than
the supreme law of the land based on the personal convictions of the
individual justices.
Ironically, the interpretivists' objection to the undemocratic traits
of this process disregards some rather explicit constitutional language.
105. See notes 30, 39, 63, 73-75 .supra.
106. See notes 30, 39, 63 supra.
107. tenBroek, supra note 30, at 421.108. See R. BERGmE, supra note 4,passim; Bork, supra note 4, at 2-12; Kurland, supra
note 4,passn; Rehnquist, supra note 3, at 704-06.
109. See Horowitz, The Jursprudence of Brown and the Diiemmas of Liberalisrm, 14
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rlv. 599, 601 (1979).
110. See notes 3-4 supra.
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Article II of the Constitution states that there shall be a Supreme
Court and, in combination with article II, decrees the Court's indepen-
dence from the electorate."' By its very terms, article III establishes a
countermajoritarian organ of government, the Supreme Court, in jux-
taposition with the more democratic Congress and Presidency estab-
lished by articles I and H. This scheme reflects one of the guiding
principles that underlies the Constitution--the principle of separate
powers that check and balance one another. The Supreme Court's con-
stitutionally mandated independence functions as a check and balance
on the more majoritarian branches of the federal and state govern-
ments. It thereby provides a means of maintaining constitutional
boundaries on majoritarian rule.
It is the Court's role to enforce constitutional requirements upon
the majoritarian branches of government, which otherwise would be
completely unbridled. As dictated by the Constitution, majority con-
trol should be the predominant feature of our government subject to
constitutional perimeters. The purpose of the Court's independence is
to ensure that those perimeters will be honored by all branches of the
state and federal governments. This was reaffirmed most forcefully by
the Senate Judiciary Committee in its rejection of President Roosevelt's
Court-packing plan:
We recommend the rejection of this bill as a needless, futile, and
utterly dangerous abandonment of constitutional principle ....
[I]t seeks to do that which is unconstitutional .... [I]ts practical
operation would be to make the Constitution what the executive
or legislative branches of the government choose to say it is---an
interpretation to be changed with each change of administration.
It is a measure which should be so emphatically rejected that its
parallel will never again be presented to the free representatives
of the free people of America." 2
Constitutional constraint upon the majoritarian branches of gov-
ernment would be illusory if the Supreme Court did not possess the
authority to create meaning for the Constitution. In the absence of a
creative judicial review, the majoritarian branches of government
would command unfettered discretion to determine the constitutional-
ity of their own acts. Elimination of the Court's creativity would de-
stabilize the system of checks and balances that has characterized our
government since its inception and would permit even temporary ma-
111. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; d. at art.L § 2.
112. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDIcIARY, REORGANIZATION OF THE FD. JUDIcIARY,
ADVERSE REPORT, S. REP. No. 711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1937).
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jorities to rule at their own whim.113 It would also reduce the Court to
an impotent figurehead, perpetually deferring to the majority will on
constitutional issues. Every act of the majority i sofacto would be con-
stitutional and would be entitled to the Court's rubber stamp as such.
Indeed, this is exactly what has occurred in the category of cases in
which the Court abnegates its creative authority by using "minimal
scrutiny""I4 to evaluate the consititutionality of legislative or executive
action. Minimal scrutiny, it turns out, is virtually no scrutiny and fur-
nishes a pretense of judicial review without the reality of it.115 A more
sweeping elimination of the Court's creativity would destroy by that
much more its capacity to practice meaningful judicial review. Devoid
of creativity, the Court would become a mere puppet, dancing to the
tune of the other branches of government. Because the Court's creativ-
ity lies at the very core of its character, deprivation of its creativity
would be tantamount to abolition of the Court itself.
Although the Court is the least democratic branch of our govern-
ment, it is not entirely undemocratic. While it is true that the justices
who comprise the Court are appointed rather than elected and that
they may be removed from office only for improper behavior;"16 never-
theless, it is also true that they are appointed by a popularly elected
President, and that their appointments must be confirmed by a popu-
larly elected Senate." 7 Turnover of the Court's personnel, which
sometimes occurs frequently, enhances this control through the reoc-
currence of the appointment-confirmation procedure." 8 Popular con-
trol of the Court also may occur through the constitutional authority
that Congress holds to regulate the jurisdiction of the Court." 9 Addi-
tionally, the Court's constitutional rulings are voidable by the people
through constitutional amendment, which, though a difficult proce-
dure, has been accomplished successfully on four separate occasions. 120
113. "[WMe must abandon the erroneous assumption that our constitutional tradition ever
required that a temporary majority should be able to rule without constitutional restraint. If
that is antidemocratic, so be it." Horowitz, supra note 109, at 603.
114. Under minimal scrutiny, the Court indulges in the presumption that legislative or
executive action is constitutional unless the party challenging it proves that it completely
lacks any reasonable basis whatsoever. For a more extensive description of minimal scru-
tiny, see Shaman, supra note 9.
115. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HIv. L. Ray. 1, 8
(1972); Shaman, supra note 9, at 163-66.
116. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; id. at art. II, § 1.
117. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cL 2.
118. L. TRmE, supra note 45, at 50.
119. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cL 2.
120. The Eleventh Amendment was contrary to the holding of Chisholm v. Georgia,
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While thus not directly answerable to the people, the Court is not en-
tirely immune to popular control.
The people also have the ultimate authority to abolish the Court.
That they have not taken this step throughout almost two centuries of
constitutional experience indicates popular acceptance of the Court's
independence."' Admittedly, many particular decisions rendered by
the Court have aroused considerable public outcry, but given the many
controversial issues that the Court must decide, this is inevitable. More
telling about the public attitude toward the Court is that the people
have taken no action to curtail the Court's constant exercise of creativ-
ity. Indeed, the public has shown little, if any, inclination toward abol-
ishing the Court or even toward restricting its powers. Despite
President Roosevelt's overwhelming popularity, his "Court-packing
plan" was a dismal failure;'" the proposal to establish a "Court of the
Union" composed of state court justices which would have the power
to overrule the Supreme Court evoked such widespread public disap-
probation that it was quickly abandoned;"z the campaigns to impeach
Earl Warren and William 0. Douglas never got off the ground;124 and
although Congress has threatened to exercise its constitutional preroga-
tive to retract the Court's jurisdiction,' 25 it has rarely done so. These
examples suggest that even in the face of controversial constitutional
2 U.S. (2 DalL) 419 (1793); the Fourteenth Amendment nullified, in part, the decision in
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); the Sixteenth Amendment nullified
the holding of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust, Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895); the Twenty-
sixth Amendment neutralized Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). L. TRIBE, supra note
45, at 50-51 & n.8.
121. See Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARv. L. REv. 193,
206 (1952).
122. "Not all the influence of a master politician in the prime of his popularity was quite
enough to carry a program that would impair judicial review." R. McCLosKEY, THE AMER-
IcAN SUPREME COURT 177 (1960). The plan was rejected vehemently by the Senate Judici-
ary Committee. See text accompanying note 112 supra.
123. L. PFEFFER, THIS HONORABLE COURT 424-25 (1965).
124. Those who campaigned for Chief Justice Warren's impeachment were unable to
have impeachment proceedings initiated against him. While impeachment proceedings
were instituted against Justice Douglas, they never got beyond the subcommittee stage and
were eventually forsaken. See SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON H. REs. 920 OF THE HOUSE COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, 91ST CONG., 2D SEss., FINAL REPORT, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE WILLIAM 0.
DOUGLAS (Comm. Print 1970).
125. "In the fifteen years between 1953 and 1968, over sixty bills were introduced in
Congress to eliminate the jurisdiction of the federal courts over a variety of specific subjects;
none of these became law." P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART &
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 360 (2d ed. 1973). Twenty
bills are now pending in Congress that seek to limit the Court's jurisdiction. TIME, Sept. 28,
1981, at 93.
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decisions, there has been an abiding public consent to the Court's in-
dependent role in our scheme of government.
Nevertheless, there are those who question the force of popular
consent to the Court. They argue that the Court enjoys public accept-
ance only by concealing its creativity and by duping the people into
thinking that its decisions are compelled by the text of the document or
by the Framers' intentions.' 26 On the one hand, this argument
presumes that the public is aware of what the Court has to say in its
written opinions and finds it persuasive; on the other, the argument
ignores that in the last sixty years, the Court has been increasingly open
about its creativity. 127 Even when the Court was less candid about its
creative role, the people must have sensed that it was engaged in creat-
ing constitutional meaning. What was the public to think, for instance,
when Andrew Jackson, proclaiming that "Congress, the Executive, and
the Court must each for itself be guided by its own opinion of the Con-
stitution," 128 felt free to veto a bill rechartering the Bank of the United
States on the ground that it was unconstitutional even though the Court
had previously upheld its constitutionality?' 29 What was the public to
think about the Legal Tender Cases,"'0 in which a change in the Court's
personnel was the obvious cause of an abrupt about-face by the
Court?' 3' What was the public to think during the New Deal Court
crisis about President Roosevelt's Court-packing plan and Justice Rob-
erts' "switch in time that saved nine"? 32 Could the public witness
these and other events, all highly publicized and momentous, and still
be unaware that the Court was creating constitutional law?
Whether or not there is public comprehension of the Court's crea-
tivity, the fact remains that our constitutional system of checks and bal-
ances that sets perimeters on majority rule was adopted by the people
and has been retained by them for these many years. That system,
which is supported by popular consent, is dependent on the Court's
creativity. Without creativity, the Court would be unable to fulfill the
constitutional obligations prescribed for it by the people. In the final
analysis, then, the Court's creative authority is derived from the people.
126. See R. BEROER, supra note 4, at 319-20; Bork, supra note 4, at 3-4.
127. See text accompanying notes 47-51 supra.
128. Andrew Jackson, Veto Message of Jul 10, 1832 in 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PREsmENTs 576, 581-82 (J. Richardson ed. 1896).
129. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
130. Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871); Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.)
603 (1870).
131. C. WARREN, supra note 8, at ch. 31.
132. See L. PFEFFEi, supra note 123, at 317.
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Conclusion
The Court's creativity effectuates its constitutional responsibility to
enforce constitutional constraints upon the majoritarian branches of
the federal and state governments. This creativity is necessary to fur-
nish meaning for the Constitution, which cannot be adequately sup-
plied either by the text of the document or by the intent of the Framers.
Although from its very beginning the Court has continuously exercised
creative authority, there are those who assert that its results have been
mostly negative.133 They argue that apart from the historical, theoreti-
cal and political foundations of the Court's creativity, more often than
not it has yielded unsound decisions. Justice Rehnquist has written
that the Court's creativity has resulted in several "disastrous exper-
iences," most notably the decisions in Dred Scott v. San dford13 4 and
Lochner v. New York,1 35 and on balance "has done the Court little
credit." 136
Ironically, this belief has not deterred him on several occasions
from utilizing strong doses of creativity in his own constitutional deci-
sions. 137 More importantly, his disparagement of the efficacy of crea-
tivity is based on a quite discriminatory sampling of cases. To be fair,
one cannot condemn the end product of the Court's creativity in Dred
Scott while neglecting to praise it in Brown v. Board of Education. 13
Similarly, in condemning "Lochnerism" as wrongheaded creativity
that misused the Fourteenth Amendment, one should not overlook the
many Fourteenth Amendment cases in which creativity has been used
to serve commendable purposes. The Court has used its creative au-
133. See Kurland, supra note 4; Rehnquist, supra note 3.
134. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
135. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
136. Rehiquist, supra note 3, at 699-704.
137. In Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 432 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), Justice
Rehnquist sought to create an implied sovereign immunity among the states; in Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), he created the rule that the Eleventh Amendment shelters the
states from being ordered by federal courts to make retroactive payments from their treasur-
ies; in Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979), and Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976),
he created constitutional exceptions to the rule that the Eleventh Amendment shelters the
states from being ordered by federal courts to make retroactive payments from their treasur-
ies; in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), he created an exception to
the federal commerce power in order to protect state sovereignty; and in Sosna v. Iowa, 419
U.S. 393 (1975), he created an exception to the previously established constitutional right to
travel interstate.
138. 347 U.S. at 483.
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thority to protect individuals from racial,139 sexual, 140 and other
forms1 41 of unjust discrimination; to establish the "clear and present
danger test" so as to prohibit the suppression of peaceful speech;' 42 and
to protect the rights of family members to live together, 43 to obtain a
complete education for their children,1 " and to send their children to
parochial schools if they so choose. 145 Unless one is prepared to dis-
miss these and other cases as wrongly decided, there simply is no basis
to the claim that the Court's creativity has done it "little credit."
The Court has made its mistakes, including a few egregious ones,
but so have the other branches of government. Possessed as they are of
human fallibility, predictably, the Court and the other branches of gov-
ernment will make mistakes in the future. The time has come to face
the Court's mistakes directly on their merits rather than to side-step
them on the pretense that they are illegitimate excursions into* creativ-
ity. Attacks on the Court's creativity are spurious and should be en-
tirely abandoned. It is time to admit, once and for all, that the Court
has always been creative; otherwise, it would be unable to provide
meaning for the Constitution or to fulfill its constitutional
responsibility.
139. See note 14 supra.
140. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
141. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973);
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528 (1973); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
142. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242
(1937); Delonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927);
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
143. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
144. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
145. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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